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CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM  
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – THE HYDRA SYNDROME
Terrorism can be compared to a dangerous hydra with many different heads (Woj­
ciechowski, 2013a: 11). They symbolize the various types of terrorism, such as 
Islamic, separatist, far right, far left, and so on (Radicalism, 2017: 49–68). The 
diversification of the terrorist threat can be easily seen in the European Union as ex-
emplified, for instance, in the latest report by Europol TE-SAT, European Union Ter-
rorism Situation and Trend Report 2017 (TE-SAT, 2017), and the analysis of events 
in 2016 and 2017.
The main purpose of this text is to answer the following questions, among others: 
what is the current scale of the terrorist threat in the European Union? What are the 
characteristics of modern terrorism in the EU? What is its specific nature and how is 
it evolving? What are its main ideological reasons and types? What is the scope and 
nature of Islamic terrorism in the European Union? What influence does immigration/
refugeeism have on the level of terrorism? How are we to evaluate the current anti-
terrorist policy of the EU? What level of terrorist threat seems to be likely in the Euro-
pean Union in the months to come? These issues are discussed in this paper in the ten 
sections below. The conclusions presented there frequently defy stereotypical opinions 
and views on terrorism in the EU.
1. According to the data collected by the US Department of State, terrorist attacks 
in the European Union account for only ca. 2% of the global manifestations of ter-
rorism (Global, 2015). The index of casualties is even lower. For instance, in 2016, 
142 persons were killed and 379 injured in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the EU. 
Globally, ca. 28,000 persons were killed and 35,000 injured in 2015. The point here is 
by no means to belittle the terrorist threat in the EU or its victims, but rather to present 
the objective scope of the problem. The number of failed, thwarted as well as success-
Figure 1. Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks in EU (2014–2016)
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Source: TE-SAT, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017 (2017), https://www.europol.eu-
ropa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017 (28.06.2017).
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ful terrorist attacks in the European Union consistently increased in 2013–2015, from 
152 in 2013, to 201 in 2014 and 211 in 2015. This trend changed in 2016 when the 
number of attacks dropped to 142 (TE-SAT, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).
The United Kingdom suffered the greatest number of attacks (103) in 2015. It was 
followed by France (73), Spain (25), Greece (4), Italy (4) and Denmark (2). In 2016, 
the majority of attacks also occurred in the UK (76), followed by France (23), Italy 
(17), Spain (10), Greece (6), Germany (5), Belgium (4) and the Netherlands (1). The 
UK’s top ranking in the two latest reports by Europol came as quite a surprise because, 
formerly, terrorist attacks most frequently occurred in France and Spain (TE-SAT, 
2016, 2017).
2. In contrast to popular opinions, jihadist attacks do not prevail in the European 
Union. For instance, only two out of 199 attacks in 2014 were classified as jihadist. 
In 2015, seventeen out of the total number of 211 attacks were inspired by Islamic 
ideology. The data gathered in 2016 shows that the primary reason for 99 out of 142 at-
tacks was separatism, followed by left-wing (27), jihadist (13), non-specified (2) and 
right-wing (1) ideologies. Terrorism in the EU seems therefore to be heterogeneous 
and highly diversified ideologically. In 2016, separatist attacks were reported in the 
UK (76), France (18) and Spain (5). Attacks inspired by far left ideology occurred in 
Italy (16), Greece (6) and Spain (5). Islamic terrorists attacked in France (5), Belgium 
(4) and Germany (4). Non-specified attacks were reported in Germany (1) and Italy 
(1), and there was one far right attack in the Netherlands. In 2016, terrorist attacks oc-
curred, in total, in eight EU member states (TE-SAT, 2017).
Table 1
Overview of the failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2016 per EU member state 
and per affiliation
Member State Jihadist Left-wing Right-wing Separatist Single issue
Not 
specified
Total
Belgium 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
France 5 0 0 18 0 0 23
Germany 4 0 0 0 0 1 5
Greece 0 6 0 0 0 0 6
Italy 0 16 0 0 0 1 17
Netherlands 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Spain 0 5 0 5 0 0 10
UK 0 0 0 76 0 0 76
Total 13 27 1 99 0 2 142
Source: TE-SAT, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017 (2017), https://www.europol.eu-
ropa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017 (20.06.2017).
3. The number of persons detained for terrorist activities inspired by jihadist ideol-
ogy increased. In 2014, 395 persons were detained, in 2015 – 687, and in 2016 – as 
many as 718. The proportion of jihad-inspired terrorists in the total number of detained 
terrorists also increased considerably, amounting to 70% in 2016, compared to 50% 
two years before. In 2016, most arrests occurred in France (429), followed by Spain 
(69), Belgium (62), the Netherlands (36), Austria (30), Italy (28) and Germany (25). 
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Poland was the scene of five detentions (the sixth detainee was accused of far right ter-
rorism). Surprisingly, there was not a single detention on Islamist charges in the UK, 
where one of the largest Muslim communities live, and the group of extreme Islamists 
there is estimated at ca. 20,000 people. Additionally, as has already been indicated, 
in 2016, most terrorist attacks occurred in the UK (all of them inspired by separatist 
ideologies).
Figure 2. Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism 2012 to 2016
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Source: TE-SAT, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017 (2017), https://www.europol.eu-
ropa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017 (1.07.2017).
In 2016, 587 persons were convicted for terrorist activities in the European Union. The 
greatest numbers of such convictions were reported in Spain (157), Belgium (138), the 
United Kingdom (89), France (68), the Netherlands (42), Germany (30) and Austria 
(26). The greatest number of sentences were passed on jihadists (61%), separatists 
(21.3%), non-specified (15.7%), right-wing (1.5%) and left-wing (0.5%) terrorists 
(TE-SAT, 2015, 2016, 2017).
Table 2
Number of verdicts in 2016 per EU Member State and per type of terrorism, as reported to 
Eurojust
Member State Jihadist Left-wing Right-wing Separatist Not specified Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Austria 26 0 0 0  0 26
Belgium 138 0 0 0  0 138
Denmark 6 2 0 0  0 8
Estonia 2 0 0 0  0 2
Finland 4 0 0 0  0 4
France 68 0 0 0  0 68
Germany 28 2 0 0  0 30
Greece 0 0 3 0  0 3
Hungary 0 0 0 1  1 2
Italy 11 0 0 0  0 11
Lithuania 0 0 0 0  1 1
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Netherlands 32 5 0 5  0 42
Portugal 1 0 0 0  0 1
Slovenia 0 0 0 0  1 1
Spain 38 116 0 3  0 157
Sweden 4 0 0 0  0 4
United Kingdom* 0 0 0 0 89** 89
Total 358 125 3 9 92 587
* The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore included 
under the category ‘Not specified’.
** The figures included in the UK submission to the TE-SAT differ from those reported by Eurojust. The UK sub-
mission included a figure of 68, consisting of 56 convictions and 12 acquittals. The TE-SAT is using the Eurojust 
figures for consistency.
Source: TE-SAT, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017 (2017), https://www.europol.eu-
ropa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017 (1.07.2017).
4. When presenting the TE-SAT 2017 report, Europol Director Rob Wainwright 
stressed that terrorists were increasingly intent on media publicity, and that is why 
they chose specific locations, targets and forms of attack. This is evidenced by their 
attacks carried out near sports facilities, concert halls, shopping malls and frequented 
roads. The profile of perpetrators is also changing. There are more and more women, 
who accounted for 18% of all detainees for terrorism in 2015 and 26% in 2016. The 
latest report by Europol brings a disturbing conclusion that terrorists operating in the 
EU are increasingly determined and professionally prepared, constantly adapting 
their operational tactics and strategies. A particularly dangerous scenario involves 
what is called a sequential attack, where a number of attacks are simultaneously 
carried out in different places and at different distances from one another. This was 
the case in Paris in 2015 and Jakarta in 2016. Terrorists are not only better trained, 
but it is increasingly difficult to neutralize them and determine their mutual relations 
(TE-SAT, 2017).
5. Terrorists will increasingly resort to easily available and simple tools to carry 
out their attacks, such as knives, axes, speeding cars and so on. At the same time, 
however, there is a growing threat that Islamists will use weapons of mass destruction, 
such as chemical, biological and radiological weapons, cyberterrorism and drones. 
Ben Wallace, UK Minister of State for Security, warned against this very scenario 
in January 2017, when he referred to a jihadist laboratory the police discovered in 
Morocco, where chemical and biological weapons could be manufactured. ISIS has 
an undetermined arsenal of weapons of mass destruction at their disposal which they 
acquired in Iraq, Syria and Libya, as well as experts in this field. If ISIS continues to 
suffer further failures, their use of WMD cannot be ruled out (Wojciechowski, Osi-
ewicz, 2017: 192–193).
The particularly underestimated threat is that of the use of biological weapons by 
Islamic terrorists. Experts especially stress the possibility of using Yersinia pestis in 
this context. In the early 2017, the World Health Organization officially recognized 
Yersinia pestis as the greatest biological threat in the modern world. Such an assess-
ment follows from the fact that it is relatively easy to produce, the disease spreads 
rapidly, the mortality rate is extremely high (for some varieties, e.g. pneumonic 
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plague, it is 90–100%), there is no appropriate vaccine, the hitherto antibiotics are 
inefficient, and the bacteria can be easily brought onto the territory of a given state 
(Giersz, 2017).
6. The authors of the TE-SAT 2017 report claim that it is difficult to identify a direct 
correlation between the EU’s migration policy and the scale of attacks in 2016. The 
data collected indicates that these attacks were typically conducted by people who had 
long lived in the EU, they were frequently born there and were citizens of EU member 
states. It is true that, over the period concerned, new entrants to the EU carried out at-
tacks, but these were isolated cases (TE-SAT, 2017).
Yet the influx of immigrants to the European Union may translate into an in-
creased threat of terrorist attacks. On the one hand, it applies to the activities of 
Islamic terrorists hiding or seeking support among immigrants and refugees (Wo-
jciechowski, 2016). On the other one, the instances have to be taken into account of 
terrorism of extremist groups (left-wing, right-wing or separatist) which, for vari-
ous reasons, oppose or support the influx of immigrants/refugees into the EU. The 
potential cooperation between terrorists and immigrants and refugees in the EU was 
confirmed in February 2016 by Hans-Georg Maassen, President of the Federal Of-
fice for the Protection of the Constitution, who reported that around one hundred 
such cases were investigated in Germany (To fakt, 2016). In August 2016, Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrea Orlando addressed the parliament, talking about 
serious suspicions concerning the significant role of ISIS in the influx of immigrants/
refugees to Italy by sea. This has been confirmed by the intercepted emails, letters 
and calls of jihadists which indicate that terrorists may be hiding on the boats carry-
ing people from Libya to Europe.
There are many different threats related to the mass influx of immigrants/
refugees to Europe and their potential ties with terrorist and criminal groups that 
have to be taken into account. These threats can be divided into criminal and 
terrorist:
terrorist threats involve smuggling drugs, weapons, people and so on. Information  –
has been collected indicating that different groups of Islamic terrorists earn profits 
‘transferring’ immigrants/refugees and selling passports. Another matter was the 
offences committed by some immigrants/refugees in Europe (so-called sex-terror) 
where women were sexually molested, especially at the time of the New Year and 
carnival. Such cases were reported mainly in Germany, but there were similar oc-
currences in Austria and Scandinavia. Apart from their social and political over-
tones, they have produced serious financial consequences. For instance, additional 
security measures that were introduced in Cologne during the carnival cost ca. 
EUR 500,000;
the terrorist threat can be divided into indirect and direct. The former encompasses,  –
among other things, cases of propaganda, recruitment, intelligence and financial 
activities. The latter is about causing a direct threat in the form of conventional or 
unconventional operations. Conventional ones involve bomb attacks and suicide 
attacks, and the unconventional – using chemical and nuclear materials, construct-
ing ‘dirty’ bombs, spreading viruses and bacteria, different operations in cyber-
space and so on.
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Figure 3. Possible types of threats initiated by terrorists using immigrants/refugees
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Source: Author’s own concept.
The mass influx of immigrants and refugees to the European Union has given rise to 
a range of political, financial, legislative and logistical challenges. One of them con-
cerns monitoring immigrants/refugees who have entered the territory of the European 
Union. This is particularly well illustrated by Germany, where in late February 2016, 
the authorities reported that they did not know the whereabouts of approximately 
130,000 immigrants/refugees registered in Germany (which accounted for 13% of all 
applications submitted in Germany in 2015). It was stated in the communication that 
the “possible reasons (for the absence of immigrants/refugees) include their return to 
their country of origin, traveling on to another country or failing to conform to the 
regulations [...]. Another explanation involves double entries in the EASY immigra-
tion system, which registers applicants for asylum.” Regardless of the explanation, 
over 130,000 individuals are off the grid in Germany alone. This group may include 
people with criminal or terrorist connections (Niemcy, 2016).
7. The current activities undertaken by the European Union and the majority of 
member states in terms of combating terrorism have to be deemed insufficient. This 
primarily concerns inadequate financial resources, an aftermath of the policy of restric-
tions and reductions launched in the security sector several years ago, which can still 
be observed (as exemplified by the operations of the police in the United Kingdom) 
and the lack of comprehensive international cooperation including, for instance, rapid 
exchange of information in full. The multi-speed policy present in many aspects of 
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EU operations is also noticeable in the field of counter-terrorism. This follows from 
the use of different and frequently incompatible systems of collecting information on 
terrorists on the one hand, and from differences in the commitment and collaboration 
of EU member states and their services in combating this threat on the other. Bibi Van 
Winkel from the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism described it adequately, 
saying that “not all EU members are ready to share the information they possess to 
the same extent.” It significantly impairs and disorganizes EU anti-terrorist policy and 
lowers the level of security (Terrorabwehr, 2016).
The TE-SAT 2017 report offers rather vague conclusions on the EU’s antiter-
rorist activities. It points to such shortcomings as the lack of adequate instruments 
to counter armed drones which could be used by terrorists, among others. Among 
the significant successes of anti-terrorist policy, the report mentions the curbing of 
Islamist propaganda on the Internet. Around 90% of all posts that encourage car-
rying out attacks, or instruct how to do so were reported to have been immediately 
removed from the web, while the persons involved in such activities are typically 
identified and apprehended.
8. One of the latest initiatives aiming to coordinate the activities of member states 
in the field of counter-terrorism was a new directive on combating terrorism adopted 
by the European Parliament on February 16, 2017 (the draft was approved by the EU 
Council in March 2016). It enhances the EU’s legislative foundations aimed at pre-
venting terrorist attacks. The regulations stipulated in the directive provide, among 
other things, for the criminal accountability of travelling abroad with the aim of joining 
terrorist structures (including individuals who return to the EU with the intention of 
continuing their terrorist activities); financing, organizing and facilitating such travel; 
terrorist training and participating in such training sessions; public encouragement of 
terrorism and glorifying it; as well as financing terrorist activities. The directive also 
discusses the issue of expanding the exchange of information on anti-terrorist opera-
tions between EU member states, and increases the rights of the victims of terrorist 
activities, urging for them to be provided with specific legal, medical and psychologi-
cal assistance (European, 2017).
European Union members have eighteen months from the publication of the new 
regulations in the Official Journal of the European Union to implement them in their 
national laws. The solutions adopted in the directive were positively assessed by a ma-
jority of experts dealing with the issue of terrorism. They have, however, been criti-
cized by Amnesty International and the European Network Against Racism, among 
others, who claim that these regulations may impair the respect for fundamental rights 
in the EU, and carry the risk of racial and religious discrimination. In the opinion of 
these organizations, the regulations “open the door to penalizing behavior that does not 
have to do with terrorist attacks whatsoever. The broad definitions of the glorification 
of terrorism or travelling for terrorist purposes may curb human rights.”
One of the main goals of the directive is to limit ISIS and its followers’ potential to 
carry out further terrorist attacks in the European Union. This threat remains extremely 
high, as stressed by Europol in its December 2016 report. Among other things, this re-
port warns about attacks against all EU member states. Europol estimates that there are 
several dozen jihadists currently staying in the EU who have the power and capacity to 
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conduct attacks involving firearms, suicide bombings and other weapons. Kidnappings 
and the explosions of booby-trapped cars are also possible scenarios (Europol, 2016).
The report stresses that the advocates of ISIS may infiltrate immigrant and refugee 
communities in Europe in order to instigate their hostility towards the country of their 
temporary stay, using not only religious and cultural arguments, but also socio-eco-
nomic and legislative ones. It is emphasized that Islamists are more and more special-
ized in recruiting marginalized young people and people with mental disorders, urging 
them to carry out suicide attacks. Additionally, fundamentalists are eager to recruit 
children and electronic media experts. This is confirmed by the FBI, which has learned 
that Islamic terrorists lack experts on social media and Internet propaganda due to the 
range of operations of US special services (including, for instance, neutralization by 
drones).
Another topic addressed in the directive is the recommendation to strictly monitor 
immigrant and refugee camps, and destroy terrorist training camps. This pertains not 
only to the Middle East and the Balkan Peninsula, but also to EU states. This is exem-
plified by Greece, where a fifty-strong team of Europol experts is operating in order 
to expose terrorists hiding in immigrant and refugee camps. Yet experts on terrorism 
differ in their assessments of this method. Some of them believe that it will hamper 
extremist activities and reduce the level of radical attitudes. Others stress the low ef-
ficiency of such activities on account of the huge numbers of people in the camps 
and frequently effective camouflage of terrorists. Another significant issue concerns 
a range of mistakes and faults in the security sector. This is well exemplified by the 
case of Brussels officials who took bribes of approximately EUR 20,000 and forged 
the passports of several ISIS fighters returning from abroad and fearing arrest. Europol 
itself was not free of problems. As a result of a breach of regulations by one of Eu-
ropol’s officials, the details of around fifty anti-terrorist investigations, including the 
names and phone numbers of suspects, were posted on the Internet.
9. An important condition to combat terrorism in the EU involves tight cooperation 
with the US, NATO, Israel and Turkey, to name just a few. Europol’s director has em-
phasized it on numerous occasions, stressing that the threat related to terrorism in the 
EU can be resolved only by further improving international collaboration. The meet-
ing held by NATO member states’ leaders on May 25, 2017 is one of the most recent 
examples of such collaboration. Several crucial decisions were made during this meet-
ing, including the permission for NATO to join a coalition combating ISIS and estab-
lishing a special unit dedicated to counter-terrorism. The coalition of states struggling 
against ISIS included 68 states, applying a range of measures to prevent the Islamist 
threat. Some take part in air rides against jihadist positions, others support the forces 
fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq, participate in special operations or offer humanitarian 
aid. The official announcement of this decision was made by NATO Secretary General 
Jens Stoltenberg, who stressed that whereas NATO had joined the international coali-
tion, this was not to mean that the Pact was automatically involved in the struggle with 
ISIS (Wejkszner, 2017; Atwan, 2015). The primary goals of NATO will be to continue 
the training of Iraqi forces in disarming improvised explosive devices, enhance intel-
ligence collaboration and extend information exchange, continue the support for elec-
tronic reconnaissance and carry out operations refueling coalition airplanes.
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10. Further escalation of terrorism, especially Islamic terrorism, should be expected 
in the European Union in the second half of 2017. This threat will no longer be limited 
just to France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, but will 
concern other member states which have not witnessed such attacks before. There are 
many reasons for that, including the fact that, having suffered a series of defeats in 
Syria and Iraq, ISIS needs spectacular successes to mobilize its followers to continue 
struggling. This is also a manifestation of the strategy of ‘creating new front lines,’ or 
carrying out attacks in new locations and making use of the determination and radical-
ism of some of its supporters. Director of Europol, Rob Wainwright has repeatedly 
stressed this, noting that ISIS decided to send ‘fanatics’ to Europe in order to distract 
attention from its failures in Syria and Iraq; he also added that “the ability to carry out 
spectacular attacks in Europe is an alternative way to sustain morale among their fight-
ers and demonstrate that ISIS is still being successful.” The greatest threat of Islamic 
terrorism is posed not by persons who fought with ISIS troops and then returned to the 
European Union for various reasons and in different ways. These people can usually 
be monitored. The same holds true for the Islamists who live in the EU and conduct 
radical activities on Internet fora and in mosques. The most dangerous people are those 
who identify themselves with Islamic fundamentalism and are prone to using terror-
ism, but who do not reveal their views in public.
The above-presented observations demonstrate the complex and diverse nature of 
terrorism in the European Union (the many-headed hydra syndrome). They also reflect 
the on-going evolution of terrorism and a number of aspects that defy media opinions 
and stereotypes.
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ABSTRACT
Terrorism can be compared to a dangerous hydra with many different heads. They symbolize 
the various types of terrorism, such as Islamic, separatist, far right, far left, and so on. The 
diversification of the terrorist threat can be easily seen in the European Union as exemplified, 
for instance, in the latest report by Europol TE-SAT, European Union Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report 2017, and the analysis of events in 2016 and 2017. The main purpose of this text is 
to answer the following questions, among others: what is the current scale of the terrorist threat 
in the European Union? What are the characteristics of modern terrorism in the EU? What is its 
specific nature and how is it evolving? What are its main ideological reasons and types? What is 
the scope and nature of Islamic terrorism in the European Union? What influence does immigra-
tion/refugeeism have on the level of terrorism? How are we to evaluate the current anti-terrorist 
policy of the EU? What level of terrorist threat seems to be likely in the European Union in the 
months to come? These issues are discussed in this paper in the ten sections below. The conclu-
sions presented there frequently defy stereotypical opinions and views on terrorism in the EU.
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WSPÓŁCZESNY TERRORYZM W UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ 
– SYNDROM „WIELOGŁOWEJ” HYDRY 
 
STRESZCZENIE
Terroryzm można przyrównać do niebezpiecznej „hydry” o wielu różnorodnych głowach. 
Są one symbolem różnych jego form, takich jak na przykład terroryzm: islamistyczny, sepa-
ratystyczny, skrajnie prawicowy (right-wing), skrajnie lewicowy (left-wing) itd. Zróżnicowa-
nie terrorystycznego zagrożenia dobrze można obserwować na przykładzie Unii Europejskiej. 
Ukazuje to choćby najnowszy raport Europolu pt. TE-SAT, European Union Terrorism Situation 
and Trend Report 2017, a także analiza wydarzeń z 2016 i 2017 roku. Głównym celem tekstu 
jest odpowiedź między innymi na następujące pytania: Jaka jest obecnie skala terrorystycznego 
zagrożenia w Unii Europejskiej? Co charakteryzuje współczesny terroryzm w UE? Na czym 
polega jego specyfika i ewolucja? Jakie są jego główne ideologiczne przyczyny oraz rodzaje? 
Jaki jest zakres i charakter terroryzmu islamistycznego w Unii Europejskiej? Jak zjawisko imi-
gracji/uchodźstwa wpływa na poziom terroryzmu? Jak należy ocenić obecną politykę antyter-
rorystyczną UE? Jak w kolejnych miesiącach może wyglądać poziom zagrożenia terrorystycz-
nego w Unii Europejskiej? Powyższe zagadnienia zostały zaprezentowane w tekście w oparciu 
o formułę dziesięciu punktów. Zawarte w nich wnioski często obalają stereotypowe opinie czy 
wyobrażenia na temat terroryzmu w UE.
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